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1 
People Power as Exception 
Three Controversies of Privatization in Posthandover Hong Kong 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, the term “neoliberalism” has become an academic catchphrase for 
describing ongoing economic restructuring processes underpinned by a free-market 
doctrine (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005). While the 
rolling back of welfare provisions and the privatization of public resources, along with 
rising inequalities and social discontent can be seen as common features of the so-called 
“neoliberal turn,” the consequences of and subsequent responses to these initiatives have 
been highly uneven in different places. As Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore have 
explained, in contrast to neoliberal rationality, in which market forces are assumed to 
operate according to immutable laws wherever they are “unleashed,” all neoliberalization 
programs must operate within particular political and administrative frameworks that to a 
great extent continue to shape the outcomes of these processes (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002, p.351). To identify the path-dependent character of neoliberalism and their diverse 
manifestations, Brenner and Theodore suggest using the term “actually existing 
neoliberalism,” which highlights the context-specific interactions between existing 
institutional landscapes and emergent market-oriented projects across a broad range of 
geographical scales. 
 
Page 1 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/cus  K.Kane@socsci.gla.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
People Power as Exception     
 
2 
Resonating with this call for attention to the variegated nature of neoliberalism, but 
rejecting the institution-centric approach of the political economists, Aihwa Ong suggests 
studying neoliberalism not as a rigid doctrine or structure, but as a set of mobile 
techniques of governing based on a new mode of optimization – techniques that are 
capable of reconfiguring the relations between the government and the governed, power 
and knowledge, sovereignty and territoriality (Ong, 2006, p.3). By adopting a neo-
Foucauldian approach centering around the idea of “governmentality,” Ong and others 
have stressed the active role of neoliberalism in producing new forms of spaces, subjects 
and social relations in the discursive domains of everyday life (Ong, 2006; Larner, 2003; 
Ferguson and Gupta, 2005). To explore the complexities “on the ground,” they argue that 
ethnographic and other case-specific modes of enquiry can be particularly useful for 
illuminating how the neoliberal vision of market freedom and anti-welfarism is translated 
and appropriated by a wide range of agencies. Ong’s research in Southeast Asia where 
market calculation has not been a norm of governing (as opposed to Western liberal 
democracies) led her to coin the terms “neoliberalism as exception” and “exceptions to 
neoliberalism” as ways to capture embedded contradictionsi (Ong, 2006, pp. 3-4). By 
looking at how neoliberal strategies were selectively applied to exclude or preserve the 
rights and entitlements of certain populations, she argues that one can arrive at a better 
understanding of the shifting relations between norms and exceptions, the role of the state 
and the market, and the mutation of the private and public spheres.  
 
By emphasizing the agency of diverse social actors, the neo-Foucauldian approach also 
calls attention to competing ethical regimes that are themselves tied to long established 
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historical and cultural discourses. The challenge, in this approach, is to elucidate how 
these existing discourses and shared social visions are reworked or interpreted anew as 
they interact with the neoliberal logic of optimization. In a similar vein, and building on 
the insights of Antonio Gramsci, Dieter Plehwe et al. (2007) have suggested scholars to 
take seriously the complex, multitudinal processes in which the market rationality of 
neoliberalism has become entrenched in civil society. They argue that neoliberalism 
should be seen as comprising of distinct “hegemonic constellations,” which may be 
constructed at different sites by various groups of people and institutions whose interests 
do not necessarily align with each other. A careful examination of the competing agendas 
of these “discourse communities,”ii including those that seek to challenge neoliberal 
initiatives, would thus help to explain how neoliberal hegemony comes to be nurtured, 
contested, transformed and sustained over time. More than simply identifying 
contingences and variegations, Plehwe et al. urge that one must not lose sight of the 
extraordinary malleability of neoliberalism, which in many cases has proved able to adapt 
to different circumstances and deflect oppositions over time. 
 
In keeping with the growing call for research into the situated discourses and practices of 
“actually existing neoliberalism,” this paper explores some of the varied responses to the 
privatization of public resources that has accompanied the recent political and economic 
restructuring in Hong Kong. Specifically, I consider three related controversies that 
revolve around the efforts of the Hong Kong SAR government (The Government of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region)iii to privatize components of its property 
assets in the years following the Asian financial crisis, which occurred shortly after Hong 
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Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997. Although all the initiatives were 
couched in the language of the “free market” that aligns well with the neoliberal logics, 
the ways in which the proposals were put forward, contested and ultimately settled 
evidenced certain long-established assumptions about the role of the market, the 
government, the economy and the provision of welfare and public amenities. By tracing 
the narratives over the course of these controversies, this paper aims to elucidate both the 
contradictions and mutual entanglements between the market rationality of neoliberalism 
and everyday discourse, and how these interactions have worked to reshape as well as 
preserve the existing regime of legitimation.v  
 
The first of these cases involved a mass protest mobilized by an environmental NGO 
against a proposal to demolish a newly completed subsidized housing estate, which the 
SAR government sold to private developers with the intention of supporting the “free” 
housing market. The second case involved a legal challenge launched by an elderly public 
housing tenant against the government’s plan to spin off some of its public housing assets 
into a real estate investment trust. The third case involved an ongoing public debate over 
the development of a mega “cultural hub” – a government-led initiative in which private 
developers were invited to build and manage a series of “world class” museums in a prime 
waterfront district. While each of the three cases had their own trajectories, all were 
initiated as part of a wider neoliberal project of rolling back direct government provision 
of welfare and public facilities. The ensuing debate in all three exhibited marked 
similarities that entail contested visions of the interface between private property 
development (which has been widely perceived to be the cornerstone of Hong Kong’s 
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“free market”), the government’s historical role in safeguarding the “public good” by 
retaining control over urban land, and the demand for the continual provision of housing 
and welfare for the lower income sector (which had enjoyed such benefits in the postwar 
period under colonial rule). As I attempt to show in this analysis, while the combined 
image of a state that is both “non-interventionist” and “benevolent” had worked in the past 
decades, the political and economic changes in the post-handover period have severely 
unsettled this previous balance, leading to a myriad of unforeseen outcomes.  
 
The three controversies, which all emerged within the time span of one year and 
challenged the legitimacy of the SAR government, prompted a flood of letters and 
commentaries in the local media. While their positions towards privatization considerably 
varied, a majority of the writers seem to have agreed that the widening debate over Hong 
Kong’s urban future was a salient demonstration of a growing civil society -- one in which 
a formerly apolitical population was becoming increasingly vocal in standing up for the 
“public good.”vi A common thread linking these interpretations was Hong Kong’s 
transition to Chinese rule, which was seen as a major rupture with the past leading to the 
growth of a collective political and civic consciousness.vii Although critical voices such as 
those of environmental NGOs and politicians associated with grassroots organizations 
continued to criticize the government for “selling out” Hong Kong in its move to privatize 
public resources, their challenges have at the same time helped arouse a sense of shared 
optimism about a newly expanded public sphere. 
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A closer look at how the controversies developed, however, suggests limits to this new 
surge of “people power.” In each case, the protests eventually dissolved when a degree of 
accommodation were made by the government and/or the property developers. The 
eventual dissolution of the debates not only stopped short of raising further questions 
about the issue of privatization under the post-handover neoliberal turn, but also worked to 
preserve many long-established assumptions about Hong Kong, including its laissez faire 
economy, harmonious population, and benevolent (colonial) government. In particular, the 
repeated portrayal of the dichotomy between “public interest” (which the government is 
supposed to safeguard for citizens), and “private interest” (which private corporations 
must pursue in maximizing profits), has continued to obscure the mutual dependence 
between the operation of the public and private sector – dependence that underpins a 
history shaped by a combination of heavy state intervention, property speculation, and 
rapid economic growth that contributed to the so-called Hong Kong economic miracle.viii 
 
My contention is that the unrest that marked each of the three controversies was largely 
the result of these hegemonic discourses being unsettled in the post-handover period, in 
which the transfer of sovereignty coincided with a sudden reversal of a two-decade long 
economic boom. The attempt of the SAR government to further liberalize the economy by 
privatizing public assets had, in this case, backfired. However, despite the simmering 
discontent and the gradual emergence of a “protest culture,” it seems that the entanglement 
of this new civic-mindedness with the deeply-embedded discourses of the “Hong Kong 
success story” has limited its potential challenge to existing power structures. In this way, 
the surge of “people power” can be seen as an exception in a double sense. First, it is 
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7 
exceptional to Hong Kong’s experience in the past decades, thus debunking the long-held 
myth of “harmonious Chinese society” and “apolitical Hong Kong people.”ix At the same 
time, in contrast to the prevailing perception of these protests as signs of an exceptional 
break towards a new age of “bottom-up” democracy, they have in many ways continued to 
reproduce the very norms they appeared to destabilize. Despite the furor against the SAR 
government in its mishandling of numerous privatization initiatives, the processes of 
neoliberalization have arguably become increasingly entrenched.  
 
 
 The Hong Kong Economic Miracle and the Discourse of “Positive Non-Intervention”   
 
Although the economic success of postwar Hong Kong is now a well-known story,x 
scholars remain divided in their explanation of the conditions that enabled it to happen. 
For adherents of neoclassical economic reasoning, Hong Kong has been successful 
because its government sought to maximize efficiencies with minimum state intervention, 
thus providing a good business environment for entrepreneurs to freely pursue their 
interests (Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992; Castells et. al., 1990; Castells, 1992). But as 
pointed out by several researchers, despite its continual emphasis on  a policy of “positive 
non-intervention,” the history of Hong Kong has always been characterized by an unusual 
degree of state involvement in the domestic economy, stemming in part from the 
government’s reliance on sizable revenues gained from land sales to support its low direct 
taxes on wages, profits, and investment (Castells et al., 1990; Brown and Loh, 2002; 
Webb, 2004). This system also allowed the government to retain a high degree of control 
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8 
over urban development and resource allocation, and by doing so ensure the maintenance 
of civil order, a condition that was especially important in the historical context of Hong 
Kong as a non-representative colonial state vulnerable to external political change (Smart, 
1992).  
 
The drastic decline of Hong Kong’s entrepot trade that resulted from the US-led embargo 
of China in the 1950s prompted the colonial government to turn to export-oriented 
industrialization (Castells et al., 1990, Castells, 1992). Simultaneously, it also vastly 
expanded its welfare provision, particularly with the development of a massive public 
housing program that helped control the cost and reproduction of labor.xi Despite this 
heavy state involvement, and the oligopolistic character of many Hong Kong industries – 
conditions that arguably resembled the Keynesian welfare state model -- Hong Kong’s 
economic policies were consistently portrayed by the government to be “non-
interventionist” and fully committed to free market principles (often by emphasizing its 
lack of protectionist measures and allowance of free flow of capital) (Henderson and 
Appelbaum, 1992, pp.12-14). The rapid economic growth throughout the 1960s and 70s 
raised the hopes of other industrializing countries emulating this “economic miracle,” and 
fueled the ideological discourse of free market economists worldwide who tried to 
reconstruct what they saw as the “lost paradise of laissez faire capitalism.” (Castells, 1992, 
p.34). 
 
This hybrid of state intervention and free market ideology in a colonial situation arguably 
makes Hong Kong an exceptional case, one in which a supposed “laissez faire” 
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9 
commitment was intertwined with a marked paternalism and discourse of a “benevolent 
state.” While the phenomena of strategic state intervention and imperfect competition has 
not been lost in the analysis of developmental state theorists, most of these interpretations 
have tended to privilege a somewhat mechanistic understanding based on general 
assumptions of the dynamics of capitalism, thus leaving out important questions about the 
formation of discourse and functions of hegemony.xii It can be argued that some aspects of 
neoliberalism, particular the emphasis on market freedom and the maximization of 
individual capability, had long been incorporated into Hong Kong’s discourse of 
development and mode of governance, where citizenry were encouraged to participate in a 
highly pro-business environment through entrepreneurial and speculative activities (while 
being strongly discouraged from political activity). It is this curious mixture that underlies 
the contradictions of the “actually existing neoliberalism” exemplified in the three 
controversies over privatization in this paper, beginning with the case of the Hunghom 
Peninsula Estate. 
 
The Demolition of the Hunghom Peninsula Estate: The Demolition of Public Faith? 
 
The Hunghom Peninsula Estate was originally conceived under the colonial government’s 
Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS), which, together with its associated 
Homeownership Scheme (HOS), was designed to assist lower and middle-income Hong 
Kong families to acquire homeownership at a subsidized rate.xiii Since their inception in 
1976, the two programs had proved to be extremely popular and were consistently 
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10 
oversubscribed. In 1997, immediately after Hong Kong’s return to China, the new SAR 
government embarked on an ambitious plan to expand the program with the aim to 
increase the overall homeownership rate from 52 to 70% within ten years. The stated goal 
was to “alleviate the impact of the high prices on both people’s livelihoods and [Hong 
Kong’s] economic competitiveness”xiv (HKSAR Government, 1997). 
 
However, the timing of this proposal coincided with the Asian Financial Crisis, which 
caused a sharp drop in property sales both in the public and private housing market.xv The 
price collapse led to widespread complaints from the middle and upper income population, 
which had invested heavily in property, and also from developers, who claimed that the 
HOS was harming the economy.xvi Under pressure to “save” the market and to maintain 
the prosperity of Hong Kong, the government announced in 2001 that the sale of all HOS 
and PSPS flats, including the newly completed Hunghom Estate, were to be suspended for 
ten months. At the same time, it also indicated its intention to reduce the production of 
subsidized homeownership flats in the longer term (La Grange, 2003).xvii In other words, 
the initial intention to create an “ownership society” with a reduced government role in 
housing provision, was now replaced with an alternative “free market solution” that was 
more fully in line with the neoliberal rationality of optimization. 
 
While this dramatic reversal of housing policy was supported by the private property 
sector, it also prompted criticism over the government’s failure to fulfill its bold promise of 
providing homeownership for the less well off. The fact that the Chief Executive was 
himself a member of the business elite further contributed to suspicions that he was 
Page 10 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/cus  K.Kane@socsci.gla.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
People Power as Exception     
 
11 
bowing to the “private interests” of the developers xviii. It should be noted that this 
perception was also anchored in the presumed dichotomy of the public and private housing 
sectors, and the perception that public housing was essentially a benevolent program 
separated from the housing market – a contradictory element of the discourses of Hong 
Kong’s development that came to the fore in this controversy.  
 
In February 2004, the SAR government sold the unoccupied Hunghom Estate to a joint 
venture between two of Hong Kong’s largest property firms, Sun Hung Kai Properties and 
New World Development. The news drew further complaints from local politicians and 
lawmakers, who said that the sale unfairly benefited big developers and was a classic case 
of favoritism. Yet it did not seem to have triggered widespread debate at the time (SCMP, 
10 February 2004, p.1). 
 
A few months later, when the property market began to show signs of taking off again after 
the prolonged slump, the developers revealed a plan to demolish all the buildings and 
replace them with luxury condominiums. The news triggered an outcry from 
environmental NGOs and other activist groups, who accused the developers of wasting 
resources due to their “blind pursuit of profits.”xix Meanwhile, politicians blamed the 
government for “colluding” with business elites. As the controversy grew bigger, the case 
began to attract increasing attention in the media, with many more groups and individuals 
coming forward to voice their concerns. These criticisms also began to shift to the lack of 
transparency in policy making, and the SAR government was portrayed as wholly 
incompetent in protecting “Hong Kong’s overall interests.” 
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Then, in a surprise u-turn after months of mounting criticisms, the developers announced 
that they had decided not to demolish the buildings but to upgrade them for resale at the 
cost of making less profits. The decision swiftly put a stop to the growing accusations, and 
was instantly hailed by the activists, the government officials, and the business sector as a 
“historical moment of Hong Kong” – a moment in which businesses were (finally) forced 
to bow to the “public wish to protect the environment” (SCMP, 11 December 2004, p.3). 
Although there were concerns that the business climate in Hong Kong had become too 
politicized, the government responded with reassuring statements that there was no reason 
to worry, as Hong Kong had become a more sustainable city with a growing level of 
environmental consciousness and corporate responsibility, and that this would foster more 
investment opportunities in the future. Since this time, the Hunghom case was also 
repeatedly featured in the mainstream media as a sign of Hong Kong entering “a new era 
of people power,” with a maturing civil society whose citizens are no longer hesitant to 
protect the “public interest.” (SCMP, 13 December 2004, p.14). 
 
While there has been growing concern for the environment in recent years, the quick 
dissolution of the Hunghom saga left a number of puzzling questions. After all, there was 
no question that the developers were still going to make considerable profits by selling the 
upgraded flats. Why then, would the accusation of collusion between the government and 
big businesses be so quickly put to rest? How might an examination of this outcome 
elucidate the meanings of “Hong Kong’s interests,” and the ways in which the neoliberal 
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13 
vision of  “minimal government” was reconciled with the long-held discourse of the 
benevolent state? 
 
A look at how the term “Hong Kong’s interests” was used in the case (as in the 
controversies of the Link Reit and cultural hub project as well) shows that it is most often 
associated with a presumed collective desire to improve the quality of life of the citizens 
and to promote a good business environment. Maintaining a sound legal system, a high 
level of freedom of expression, and a free and competitive economy, were also repeatedly 
invoked. But while these conceptions of ideal conditions appeared to be somewhat shared, 
not everyone agreed on how they could be achieved. As the unfolding narratives of the 
controversy clearly shows, different parties had been jockeying to assert their own agendas 
by adopting portions of the familiar set of discourses about Hong Kong. 
  
As mentioned earlier, the flash point of the Hunghom controversy was the developers’ 
decision to demolish all of the new and unoccupied buildings. The environmental activists, 
headed by Friends of the Earth (FOE), criticized this as a tremendous waste of resources 
not only in terms of physical materials but also in the construction process of the 2,470 
flats, which required substantial energy, manpower and time to produce and were perfectly 
ready to be inhabited (FOE website). If the demolition of the flats were allowed to go 
ahead “it would erode the moral values of the younger generation, as the project 
epitomizes the total lack of corporate social responsibility due to the “blind pursuit of 
profits” (SCMP, 4 December 2004, p.5).  
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14 
Immediately after FOE unleashed its criticism, the executive director of New World issued 
a statement justifying that the redevelopment by claiming that it would “bring huge social 
and economic benefits to Hong Kong while correcting a major mismatch in land 
resources” (SCMP, 2 December 2004, p.17). Denouncing the design of the existing 
buildings as substandard, he said that the flats were “too small” and their quality “too 
poor” for market consumption at a prime waterfront site, and that it would send the wrong 
message to the younger generation if the use of precious land resources were not being 
maximized. Meanwhile, Sun Hung Kai Properties (the partner of New World 
Development) called the Hunghom Estate a “malicious tumor” because of its detrimental 
effect on the housing market and inefficient use of land. Sun Hung Kai further claimed that 
by adopting innovative “demolition and recycling technology”, the development could 
serve better to raise Hong Kong people’s environmental awareness.xx 
 
It can be argued that the developers’ statements were a rather stretched response to FOE’s 
critique. But they nonetheless illustrate the limited range of competing justifications for 
the use of land resources within the Hong Kong public sphere. Although FOE and the 
developers disagreed on the demolition of the buildings, each was invoking the same set 
of notions of efficiency, sustainability, and education for the young generation – arguably 
widely perceived to be the key determinants for making Hong Kong a more attractive and 
competitive city. Above all, it was the competing interpretations of the moral message of 
the demolition that was most forcefully argued. The contestation of moral claims is 
significant here, as it went beyond disagreements over how to provide the best solution 
based on technical calculation. By drawing upon cultural and ethical values embedded 
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15 
within a language and collective experience specific to Hong Kong,xxi both parties were 
attempting to incorporate these values into their visions for the future, and thereby shore 
up their legitimacy. 
 
It is worth noting that although the work of FOE and other non-profit organizations are not 
driven by direct economic gains, they are nonetheless striving to gain authority over how 
major decisions over the allocation of public resources are made, and thus are heavily 
implicated both in the contests of political power as well as the ongoing reconfiguration of 
the techniques of governing. To follow Plehwe et al.’s comment on the constitution of 
hegemonic constellations, while it is crucial to study the work of these advocacy groups, 
grassroots organizations and other “private authorities,” one should be careful not to draw 
too sharp a line between their positions and that of the state and powerful corporations, as 
there is always the tendency -- and one abundantly evidenced in the Hunghom case – of 
many NGOs to end up endorsing elements of the very neoliberal logic which they were 
attempting to oppose.xxii  
 
As the opposition against the Hunghom estate demolition continued to strengthen, with 
more professional bodies joining to declaim the demolition as violating the principles of 
sustainable development, both the developers and the government modified their rationale 
for the deal (SCMP, 7 December 2004, p.3).xxiii In December 2004, New World issued a 
statement acknowledging for the first time that “making a bigger profit” was a crucial 
factor for the demolition, but it insisted that this was simply a response to the changed 
market situation. No longer emphasizing the “social and environmental benefits” of the 
Page 15 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/cus  K.Kane@socsci.gla.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
People Power as Exception     
 
16 
redevelopment, the developers now claimed that the deal was a pure “commercial 
decision” based on the “principle of free markets and respect for the rule of law.” On the 
same day, the Secretary of Housing and Land told the press that demolition was an 
“unfortunate event” for which no officials were responsible. But he emphasized that it is 
very important to respect the rule of law and the “spirit of contract.” “We have to consider 
the impact on Hong Kong’s business reputation, rule of law, and how public officials 
exercise their discretionary power if we oppose the demolition,” he said (SCMP, 7 
December 2004, p.3). 
 
The invocation of the “rule of law” was also echoed by the Minister of the Environment 
who nevertheless appealed to the developers “not to pull down the buildings because it 
violates environmental principles” (SCMP, 3 December 2004, p.3). However, she also 
stated that she was “powerless” under the law to stop the redevelopment against the 
wishes of the developers.xxiv She added, “We can’t change the law because of some moral 
standards as this is very important to the spirit of the rule of law in Hong Kong.”  
 
The amazingly coherent invocation of the “spirit of the rule of law” at this point in the 
Hunghom saga seems to mark a significant shift of discourse from one that plays down the 
“profit-seeking motive” of the developers to one that underscores the respect for the law-
abiding, “free-market principles”, which are seen as key to Hong Kong’s stability, 
freedom, and independence as a capitalist special administrative region of China. But 
while the “rule of law” and “free market principles” clearly had widespread appeal, the 
ways in which the Hunghom sale was negotiated turned this argument on its head. Seen to 
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17 
have been made entirely behind closed-doors, the sale was increasingly criticized for not 
reflecting the supposed transparency and fairness of economic competition associated with 
a well-functioning free market. Instead of dissolving criticisms, this rhetoric worked to 
raise even more suspicions, as they appeared simply to be tactics aimed at preempting 
further inquiry into the case.  
 
In light of the sharp criticisms of the project, it is worth noting that the sale negotiation of 
the Hunghom Estate was in fact not unusual or different from “normal” property dealings 
in Hong Kong, where the government “landlord” and the property lessee carry out their 
negotiation privately without releasing details of the deal to the public.xxv What was 
different about the Hunghom case is that it involved the selling of a government 
subsidized housing estate that was seen to be a quasi “public” property belonging to a 
benevolent housing program. In the context of growing dissatisfaction with the 
government’s performance on many fronts coupled with a worsening economy, the 
demolition of the estate was, to paraphrase the headline of a news article, a salient 
demonstration of the “demolition of public faith.”  
 
Although the developers’ u-turn decision was seen as a back-down in face of the protests, 
in reality their decision was not so much about “succumbing to public interests,” but about 
protecting their public image by diffusing the idea of their “collusion” with the 
government. A key determinant of the resolution of the debate seems to be anchored in a 
popular perception that activities of corporate businesses have always been based on what 
was referred to as the “blind pursuits of profits,” which had prevented them from giving 
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any concern to the well being of society. The widespread anger surrounding the 
demolition, seen from this perspective, seems to have arisen precisely from two linked 
accusations: the developers’ taking away of benefits from the “public,” and the SAR 
government’s failure to safeguard these benefits by giving in to “private interests.” 
 
It is by recognizing this deeply rooted binary conception of the “private” and “public” 
spheres that the peculiar outcomes of the Hunghom saga can be explained. The decision to 
preserve the buildings presents a reversal of the usual assumption about corporate 
businesses in Hong Kong. By claiming that they would be willing to make less profits, 
they were able to present an unexpected benevolent image. Yet, what lies behind this 
resolution is the common belief that in the absence of a special deal, the operation of the 
housing market is natural and unobjectionable. In other words, by backing off the most 
problematic part of the project (i.e. the demolition), the developers succeeded in diverting 
attention away from the “normalized collusion” that is always present. Not only did the 
issue of privatization cease to incite further debate, the underlying myths of scarce land 
resources, public housing as benevolent, and the competitive free market remain as facts 
taken for granted, and the system relationships remain as ever obscured.  
 
 
The Heroine and the Enemy of the People: Lo Siu-lan and the Link Reit Saga  
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At about the time when the Hunghom demolition plan was scrapped, Hong Kong found 
itself embroiled in another major controversy over the privatization of government assets, 
which again propelled thousands of people to take to the streets. However, what was being 
protested against this time was not primarily the initiative for privatization itself. Instead, 
somewhat ironically, the protests were led by investors against an elderly public housing 
tenant who sought to stop the Housing Authority from privatizing its public housing assets 
through what would be the world’s largest real-estate investment trust: the Link Reit.xxvi   
 
Not unlike the privatization of the HOS flats, the initiation of the Link Reit was 
underpinned by the government’s decision to more fully implement neoliberal strategies 
of optimization in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. The purpose was to further 
advance the efficiency of public amenities provision by moving to a market driven model, 
and in doing so to relieve the government of its financial responsibilities. Under this 
arrangement, the shopping malls and car parks of all of the public housing estates owned 
by the Housing Authorityxxvii would be sold to a real estate investment trust.xxviii The first 
of its kind in Hong Kong, the sale aimed to raise 2.7 billion US dollars and was expected 
to be a significant step to help the government lower its budget deficit (Business Times 
Singapore, 21 December 2004). The prospects of the listing on the stock market not only 
attracted tremendous interest from institutional funds, but also from hundreds of thousands 
of individual small investors eager to capitalize on what they saw as a unique speculative 
opportunity.xxix And the share offer was 120 times oversubscribed well before its proposed 
date of listing on the stock market in December 2004. 
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However, in September 2004, Lo Siu-lan, a 67 year old single public housing tenant who 
worried that the privatization of the public amenities would affect the estate tenants’ 
livelihood, launched a legal challenge against the Housing Authority for breaching the 
Housing Ordinance by failing to fulfill its stated statutory duty “to safeguard the interests, 
welfare and comfort of the tenants” (SCMP, 6 July 2005, p.3). After her case was turned 
down in the Court of First Instance and the High Court, Lo threatened to take it to the 
Court of the Final Appeal (i.e. the highest court in Hong Kong) only days before the Reit 
was to be listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The ongoing lawsuit eventually 
forced the government to suspend the stock listing in the eleventh hour, and announce that 
the sale would have to be rescheduled along with all the money returned to the 
investors.xxx  
 
The forced suspension of the Reit provoked widespread anger especially among small 
investors, who accused Lo and the legislators supporting her of abusing her legal rights 
and “harming the overall interests of Hong Kong”xxxi (SCMP, 22 December 2004; The 
Standard, 22 December 2004). The government was also quick to denounce Lo for 
jeopardizing a well-intended deal that would help finance subsidized housing and benefit 
Hong Kong in the long term. This was most famously represented by the headline news in 
which the Minister of Housing likened Lo’s lawsuit to a “911-style attack”xxxii (SCMP, 22 
December 2004). Meanwhile, other legislators saw the incident as a “perfect storm” 
primarily caused by incompetent bureaucrats. Connecting the case with the growing 
disappointment with the government’s performance on many fronts, the Link Reit saga 
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was said to evidence the SAR administration’s continual failure to bridge the social divide 
and secure “Hong Kong’s interests.”  
 
The contradictory reactions and confusion surrounding the Reit suspension was soon 
further complicated by the revelation that the Housing Authority had applied to the Court 
of Final Appeal to shorten the appeal period for Lo (which reserved the right to take 28 
days to consider if she was to appeal her case). The news prompted fear among 
lawmakers, who criticized the government for interfering with the judicial system and 
potentially eroding its autonomy – an anxiety widely shared in the years following Hong 
Kong’s handover to Chinese rule.xxxiii Scrambling to defend the government’s position, the 
Secretary for Justice responded by explaining that the Housing Authority was “not a 
government department but an independent organization” whose autonomy had always 
been fully respected (SCMP, 24 December 2004, p.2). Furthermore, she pledged that the 
public should not view the Authority’s action negatively, as it was “an atypical application 
for an atypical situation” given the significant (positive) impact of the stock listing. Citing 
examples from other countries, she said it was not a big deal to ask courts to shorten 
appeal periods in order to protect the public interest. 
 
It is interesting to note that, unlike in the Hunghom incident in which the reference to the 
rule of law was repeatedly and unanimously hailed as a cornerstone of Hong Kong’s 
success, in the Link Reit saga the “rule of law” came under various attacks when it 
threatened the upwardly mobile dreams of the investing public. The paradox, of course, is 
that the suspension of the listing occurred because of the suspected illegality of the move 
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to privatize government assets in the first place. Although Lo’s call for a judicial enquiry 
was in every way conducted according to the rule of law, her action was criticized by both 
the investors and the government (as well as in sizable portion of the media and wider 
public) to be an inappropriate use of her right. Meanwhile, the Housing Authority’s 
attempt to block Lo from appealing to the top court – a clear example of interfering with 
the rule of law -- was posed as an exceptional case.  As described in a media commentary, 
Lo’s stance was likened to be “someone pulling the emergency brake on a train for no 
good reason, and then congratulating herself (and being congratulated by others) that there 
was such a safety feature without minding whether it was a sensible thing to do” (SCMP, 
31 December 2004, p.16).  
 
A day after the Secretary of Justice released her statement, the controversy took another 
turn. On December 25, two small investors filed a claim with the Small Claims Tribunal 
seeking compensation for their losses from the shelved listing. But what mattered to them, 
as they explained, was not the money, but “the justice that needs to be returned to the 
public”xxxiv (SCMP, 25 December 2004, 2). Accusing the two legislators supporting Lo in 
her appeal, they claimed that the former were “masterminding” Lo and using the case to 
advance their own political interests. They also criticized the government for not taking 
the lead the in defending Hong Kong’s reputation as a financial hub. These complaints 
were resonated in the popular media and internet chat rooms, with angry voices lamenting 
the so-called “black hands” behind Lo’s legal challenge. Within the business sector, there 
were growing fears about a government without the political will and capacity to contain 
the growth of an “anti-establishment forces.” The sentiment was captured by a leading 
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property tycoon Ronnie Chan, who claimed that Hong Kong was turning “into the most 
communist city in China” and that the free market was being dangerously eroded (SCMP, 
22 December 2004, 16).  
 
As the court case dragged on and the controversy continued to escalate, more groups 
coming  forward either to support or condemn Lo’s legal challenge against the SAR 
government. But it soon became apparent that the most vocal voices were on the side of 
the investors. On New Years Day, 2005, a protest organized by the 1000-strong Hong 
Kong Securities and Futures Industry Staff Union was launched. Titled “Against 
Politicians Messing Up Hong Kong,” the organizers proclaimed that their aim was to 
protest against social incidents being politicized and to safeguard Hong Kong’s reputation 
as an international financial centre (SCMP, 20 December 2004, p.11). But despite the 
claim of anti-politicization, the march nevertheless attracted several political parties, 
including the pro-government Democratic Party for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) 
and the more critical Liberal Party. It was also joined, somewhat ironically, by a large 
number of public housing tenants who had invested in the Link Reit themselves. Echoing 
the organizer’s claim to protect Hong Kong’s interests, some of them admitted that they 
were “not very knowledgeable about politics,” but felt that as citizens they had a duty to 
support Hong Kong’s free-market and safeguard its business environment (Financial 
Times, 21 December 2004).  
 
Lo finally went ahead and filed her appeal.xxxv As anxious investors awaited the court 
decision, more voices emerged calling for a concerted effort to rebuild trust and return 
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Hong Kong to a “harmonious society.” Like in the later development of the Hunghom 
controversy, comments in the major newspapers began to interpret the Link Reit saga as 
reflecting the growth of “people power,” with citizens becoming increasingly active in 
fighting for their rights. For its part, the government also became more vocal in its vows to 
be accountable (SCMP, 17 January 2005).xxxvi By the time Lo’s appeal was finally turned 
down by the top court later in the year, the controversy had already began to subside, with 
the attention now turning to the re-launching of the Link Reit. 
 
Although it was obvious that the unrest surrounding the Link Reit was instigated by the 
investors’ disappointment in losing their money, the moral claim of “protecting Hong 
Kong’s interests” was, as in the Hunghom controversy, repeatedly invoked as a central 
theme, with a large number of people either supporting or decrying privatization, each 
blaming the SAR government for failing its duty to ensure the proper protection of “public 
interests.” The widespread criticism of Lo’s action, and the eventual return to “social 
harmony,” so to speak, is arguably yet another salient indication of the ensuing power of 
discourse and a long-established pro-business governmentality. As in the Hunghom case, 
the entangled meanings of the rule of law, the benevolent state and the free market – all 
key components underlie the regime of legitimation in Hong Kong – had been unsettled, 
but ultimately reabsorbed within a narrative of “growing civil society” that nevertheless 
readily aligns itself with the pro-market neoliberal vision. These contradictory dynamics 
were exemplified on a much larger scale in another, still unresolved, controversy over the 
development of the West Kowloon Cultural Hub.  
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Visioning A Cultural Hub for Asia’s World City: The Controversy over the 
Development of West Kowloon 
 
The idea of creating a special cultural district for Hong Kong was first conceived in 1996 
by the Hong Kong Tourist Association.xxxvii It was reintroduced with a much expanded 
scope by the SAR Chief Executive in 1998  – a year after the handover and at a time when 
Hong Kong was struggling with an unexpected economic fallout along with a declining 
property market. The stated goal of the ambitious new scheme, which involved building a 
series of world class museums and cultural venues on an expansive, newly reclaimed 
waterfront site, was to provide the necessary hardware for Hong Kong to become a 
leading international arts and cultural centrexxxviii (HKSAR Government, 1999). In 
conjunction with several new infrastructure projects, including the Cyberport and the 
Hong Kong Disneyland, the West Kowloon Cultural Hub was intended to boost the city’s 
economic competitiveness and induce optimism for the future. 
 
In an effort to promote the project, the Government launched an international competition 
for the design of the hub in 1999. Nine months later it announced that the first prize went 
to the British architect Norman Foster, who had already built the much-acclaimed Hong 
Kong Shanghai Bank headquarters and the new Hong Kong International Airport (Hinge, 
2002, pp.48-68). Foster’s design featured the world’s largest glass canopy, which would 
cover the entire cultural district along an extensive harbourfront promenade. The jury 
praised the project for its potential to bring about an “urban miracle” by giving Hong 
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Kong a spectacular icon -- one that was “progressive and well suited for Hong Kong’s 
image in the 21st century” (Hong Kong Imail, 1 March 2002).  
 
Despite it’s wide publicity, the competition, much like many previous government 
projects, did not aroused much excitement among the Hong Kong public, and in the years 
that followed the proposals gradually faded away from the limelight. The turning point 
that marked the beginning of the controversy came in September 2003, when the 
government announced that it would, in a break from tradition, invite private developers to 
finance, construct, and operate the entire project, including all of its cultural facilities 
designed for public use. The move was explained to be in line with the SAR government’s 
philosophy of “small government, big market,” where the private sector was needed “to 
step in and provide services traditionally paid out of public funds”xxxix (SCMP, 18 March 
2002, p.4). In addition, to combat the ongoing problem of “piecemeal development” and 
ensure the integrity of the architectural design, the entire project would be offered to a 
single developer that would assume management of the hub for thirty years (SCMP, 8 
September 2003, p.14; Financial Times 5 September 2003). 
 
Although the idea of corporate operation of cultural facilities was posed as an innovative 
initiative (and one that clearly in line with the neoliberal market-driven model), it was in 
fact an extension of a long-established “partnership” practiced between government and 
big businesses in urban development.xl But as discussed earlier in Hunghom case, the 
assumed separation of the public and private sphere, whereas the government was 
expected to take care of all civic works and public amenities while leaving private 
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corporations to freely (and rightfully) pursuit their profits, had been unsettled in the 
cultural hub proposal. The perceived breaching of private interests into the “public 
domain” had once again raised the specter of “collusion.”  
 
The news of privatizing the cultural hub thus triggered a stream of negative responses. The 
most vehement came from the local arts communities, who warned that commercial 
interests would turn the hub into a “big cultural IBM” or “Microsoft in the arts” a de facto 
cultural monopoly that would only stifle the development of local arts (Financial Times, 
22 September 2003, p.4). This view was shared by several professional groups, including 
the Hong Kong Institute of Architects, which criticized the glass canopy was an 
unnecessary and wasteful icon, and that it was wholly illogical that the project had to be 
handed to a single developer simply because of this design feature (SCMP, 24 September 
2003). Another line of complaints came from environmental activists, including most 
notably the People’s Council on Sustainable Development. Referring to the future West 
Kowloon as a  “developers colony,” it urged the government to provide an alternative plan 
that would ensure wider public participation to safeguard Hong Kong’s interests 
(Financial Times, 22 September 2003, p.4). 
 
The growing disquiet against the government’s “succumbing to private interests” 
prompted several senior officials to step out to defend the proposal. The Chief Secretary 
asserted that West Kowloon was not a commercial development and that it was not 
intended to cater for the developers but the larger Hong Kong public” (SCMP, 28 October 
2003, p.4). Another spokesperson from the Housing, Planning and Lands Bureau gave 
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28 
further reassurances that the government would retain the full power to control the project, 
including setting up detailed binding requirements which the developers must comply with 
in order to protect the larger interest of Hong Kong (SCMP, 28 October 2003, p.4). 
But the government’s pledges to be tough with the developers were unable to deter 
continuous criticisms. This included, ironically, those coming from small and medium 
sized property developers, who saw the proposed single-developer approach as 
fundamentally unfair because it only favored big development firmsxli (SCMP, 14 
November 2003, p.3). Not long after, attacks were launched by the Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants after it discovered that the government had breached its 
own accounting rule by seeking to push the project ahead without bypassing the funding 
approval process in the Legislature Council.xlii Legislators also criticized that it was also 
trying to skip the scrutiny of the Town Planning Board by specifying all areas of the hub 
as “other uses” on the zoning planxliii (SCMP, 18 November 2003). These complaints soon 
triggered a new wave of protests, this time including those of the civil servants 
themselves. “The plan was very dangerous,” commented one unidentified official, “The 
rule of the game was designed to bypass all the monitoring mechanisms that left us unable 
to have any checks and balances” (SCMP, 17 November 2003, p.1). 
 
The explosion of discontent around this project, which started out so innocuously, raised 
puzzling questions: Why was the SAR government so fixated in pursuing this proposal, 
and why did it insist on this particular funding approach? 
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The flash point of the saga was the idea that the entire cultural hub would be privatized 
and built by a single developer. If West Kowloon was yet another government funded 
development, it would arguable have gone ahead without being questioned. To explain the 
rationale behind the new approach, it must be considered with regards to other 
components within the discourse of the benevolent state: While it was expected to 
orchestrate welfare and all aspects of public works, the government was also supposed to 
be “efficient,” “prudent,” and “small.” From this perspective, the privatization of West 
Kowloon then appeared to carry many potential benefits: It could encourage 
“entrepreneurship in the arts,” allow for the “flexibility” and ingenuity of private 
businesses to thrive, and at the same time avoid adding any expenditure to the government 
which had been struggling with a huge budget deficit. The project could thus be seen as 
bolstering the position and legitimacy of the SAR government. And yet, as discussed 
earlier in the Hunghom case, there is a deep irony in the government’s continual emphasis 
of their laissez-faire credentials and their simultaneous paternalistic involvement in Hong 
Kong’s housing development. Despite its ideological commitment to “positive non-
intervention,” the West Kowloon case can be seen as yet another – but more explicit – 
example of the government’s consistent and heavy intervention in the economy and the 
built environment. 
 
In June 2004, the tender phase for West Kowloon came to a close. As expected, there were 
only a few submissions, four of which came from Hong Kong’s most powerful 
developers.xliv Yet, there is one unexpected, and indeed, ironic result: Two out of the five 
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bidders decided to scrap Foster’s canopy – the supposedly most important design feature 
that was said to be the key reason for adopting the single-developer approach. 
 
As the bid phase of the project continued to unfold, the government suffered further 
setbacks as the Legislative Council passed a motion for a full review of the legality of the 
single-developer approach.xlv Soon after, a demonstration was organized to protest against 
the lack of public consultation and the “collusion” between the government and big 
businesses (The Standard, 23 Decomber 2004). Like in the Hunghom and the Link Reit 
controversies, the government’s supposed commitment to “benevolence” and the “free 
market” was increasingly brought into doubt, with criticisms increasingly shifting to the 
lack of transparency in its handling of property deals, and the issue of “collusion” came to 
the fore over and over again.  
 
In light of the project’s floundering momentum, the government eventually decided to 
further extend the public consultation period. At the same time, perhaps to the delight of 
many critics, it also began to reposition itself and to try to bring opposition groups onside 
by involving them as “strategic partners” for planning a “different and better future” for 
the cultural hub. Indeed, as revealed in the later updates on the project, the government 
has all but completely backtracked from its original position. The project has now reverted 
to the “normal approach” to development. In other words, the cultural facilities will likely 
be built and managed by the government and the commercial areas sold to the property 
firms. The fact that Hong Kong’s economy recovered significantly after the height of the 
controversy, and that government spending was under less pressure made this decision 
Page 30 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/cus  K.Kane@socsci.gla.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
People Power as Exception     
 
31 
easier. Indeed, this direction also helps to retain the “double myths” of Hong Kong: that of 
the benevolent state, and the competitive free markets, and thereby restores “social 
harmony,” so to speak. The fact that West Kowloon has already begun to proceed along 
these lines reveals how intrinsic historical discourses are tied to the regimes of legitimacy, 
and how their trajectories continue to shape political and social practices within the 
neoliberal restructuring process of the present. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The three controversies examined in this paper together illustrate the ways in which the 
change in sovereignty and the economic malaise that coincided in Hong Kong’s post-
handover period prompted the new SAR government to derive new strategies to assert its 
legitimacy. One of these strategies was the push for privatization of its public property 
assets, where the government attempted to portray an image of being “lean” and 
“efficient” by reducing public expenditure. While the rhetoric of “small government, big 
market” arguably aligns with the emerging neoliberal logic with a general emphasis on the 
retreat of the state, the ways in which privatization was promoted and implemented, and 
the reactions it generated in the populace indicates peculiarities that can only be explained 
in light of Hong Kong’s history of development, which gave rise to particular discourses 
about the roles of the market and government, the private and public spheres, and the 
regimes of rights and obligations.  
 
Page 31 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/cus  K.Kane@socsci.gla.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
People Power as Exception     
 
32 
By examining the dynamics played out in the three controversies, I have also attempted to 
illustrate how aspects of neoliberalism, in particular free market ideology and non-
interventionist government, have in fact long been incorporated into the discourse of 
development in Hong Kong.  At the same time, this ideology was unusually intertwined 
with a marked paternalism combined with a discourse of a benevolent state, where the 
colonial government provided a safety net for the working class thereby instilling a strong 
sense of collective upward mobility. This combination, which has its basis in the marriage 
of market liberalism with a lack of political participation, has emerged as a particular 
mode of governance in which individuals are encouraged to participate in a highly pro-
business environment through entrepreneurial and speculative activities.  
 
Arguably, this governing strategy can also be seen as part of the attempt by the British 
administration to retain social peace and boost legitimacy in a colonial city-state facing 
constant threats of unrest. In the post-handover period, the SAR government attempted to 
build on these past policy practices. However, the changed circumstances in the period, 
particularly in respect to the loss of confidence in the economy and growing demands for 
democratic reform, led the government’s projected benevolent image to backfire. The 
populist responses can be seen therefore as a potentiality in which the crack in the colonial 
discourse was brought to the fore.  
 
The outburst of demand for a more responsible government and the growing frequency of 
people taking to the streets have also unsettled the long-held perception of “harmonious 
Hong Kong society.” The phenomena has been seen by many local critics as a sign of a 
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growing “people power,” where a formerly docile, apolitical population is becoming 
increasingly vocal and reflexive. However, a closer examination of how the three stories 
unfolded seems to indicate that this is far from an evolutionary development of democratic 
aspirations that was often believed to be a natural outcome of decolonization. Indeed, what 
they indicate is an exception in which Hong Kong’s historical practices shaped a very 
different experience. In each of the three cases, the government’s subsequent backtrack to 
“business as usual” appears to have calmed the supposedly insurgent populism, 
underlining the linkage between neoliberal logic, welfarist claims, and Hong Kong’s 
ambitions to be a leading world city. It also illustrates the ways in which public activism 
in the post-handover period is itself closely connected and often confined to the 
hegemonic discourses of Hong Kong’s colonial past. The rise of “people power,” seen this 
way then, is not so much an exception, but rather a continuation of the normalized course 
of Hong Kong’s political and social practices. 
 
 
                                                    
i
 See Ong’s ethnographic case studies in which  she explores the condition of neoliberal exceptions 
in a variety of contexts in Southeast Asia. In Neoliberalism as Exception, 2006. 
 
ii
 Here Plehwe et al. are referring to Peter Haas’ concept of “epistemic communities,” which has 
helped inform their analysis of the ideational aspects of neoliberal hegemony. See Plehwe et al., 
p.3.   
 
iii
 Also known as the HKSAR Government -- the new administration that was established in 1997 
after the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule. 
 
v
 The analysis of the cases in this paper is primarily based on reading over six hundred newspaper 
articles from major Hong Kong newspapers published during this period. Although only a limited 
number of references are explicitly cited, the full range have informed my narrative of the three 
controversies as well as the lens through which I have tried to understand the shaping of public 
discourse around privatization in post-handover Hong Kong. Although no formal interviews were 
conducted, the framing of this analysis has also benefited from my involvement with civil society 
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organizations in Hong Kong during this time and my interaction with some of the people involved 
in these controversies 
 
vi
 A survey of the editorials and commentaries in the major Chinese and English language 
newspapers throughout 2003 and 2004 illustrates this growing belief in Hong Kong’s new civic-
consciousness. For a discussion of the growth of participatory politics and the issues that have 
attracted increasing public debate in the posthandover years, see Christine Loh, Participatory 
Politics: Civic Engagement in Hong Kong, 2004.   
 
vii
 The most dramatic expression was the mass rally on July 1, 2003, when more than half a million 
Hong Kong citizens took to the street to protest against the proposed national security bill and the 
general poor performance of the SAR administration. For a discussion of the changing attitude 
towards politics and the growth of protest movements from the years leading up to Hong Kong’s 
handover and afterwards, see Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, Crisis and Transformation in 
China’s Hong Kong, 2002; and Mathews et al., “Rejoining the Nation: Hong Kong, 1983-2006,” 
2008.  
 
viii
 For a critical discussion on the postwar economic development in Hong Kong, see Castells et 
al., 1990; and Castells, 1992. 
 
ix
 Although this is a common perception, a closer look at Hong Kong’s earlier history shows that 
there had been many protests and strikes throughout the colonial period. Nevertheless, these 
incidents have become less pronounced from the 1970s onward along with rapid economic growth. 
For a discussion of the history of social unrest in early Hong Kong, see Tsai Jung-fang, Hong 
Kong in Chinese History, Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1841-1913 (New 
York: Columbia University Press), 1993. For an example of the kinds of arguments that support 
the contemporary perception of  “harmonious” social fabric of Hong Kong, see Lau Siu-kai and 
Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese, 1988. 
 
x
 This success story is often discussed in conjunction with other newly industrialized countries in 
the Asia Pacific Region, including Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea (the so-called “Asian 
tigers”), which all underwent significant improvement in overall economic conditions in the 1970s 
and 80s. 
 
xi
 These also include a comprehensive system of education, public health, subsidized mass transit, 
social services, and subsidized foodstuffs. See Castells et al.,, 1990; and Castells, 1992.  
 
xii
 Mark T. Berger notes that although development state theorists have offered important insights 
on East Asian economies, it is increasingly clear that many of their views also share key 
assumptions with neoliberalism, as both tend to adhere to a rather technocratic and ahistorical 
interpretation of society. See Berger, “The Neoliberal Ascendancy and East Asia,” 2006, p.106. 
 
xiii
 The PSPS and HOS schemes were conceived as part of the Ten Year Housing Program 
implemented in 1973 under the administration of the then Hong Kong Governor MacLehose. 
Under these two programs, land was granted by the government to developers or contractors for 
construction of the flats. The Housing Authority -- the quasi government agency in charge of 
renting and selling public housing -- would then guarantee to buy back all the units at a pre-set 
price after completion and sell them as subsidized housing to the public. 
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xiv
 This would include providing a total of 85,000 flats per year of which 50,000 units would be 
built under the HOS and PSPS programs. Note that the government’s plan to increase the 
homeownership rate included the production of housing in both the private and public sectors. 
 
xv
 Property prices had declined dramatically, sometimes as much as 60% or more. See La Grange 
2003, p.28.  
 
xvi
 For a discussion of the social and economic functions of the property market, see Bob Jessop 
and Ngai-Ling Sum, “An Entrepreneurial City in Action,” pp.2287-2313.  
 
xvii
 Thereafter, sales would be restricted to 9,000 flats a year until 2005/6.  In 2002, the government 
announced that subsidized homeownership flat production was to be reduced to “the minimum 
required to provide insurance against unforeseen changes in the economic situation. Instead 
adequate loan finance will be made available to allow eligible households to purchase flats in the 
private sector. The benefits to the families concerned will be paralleled by the benefits to the 
public purse.” HKSAR Government, Policy Address, 2002. 
 
xviii
  The SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa was the former CEO and chairman of Overseas 
Orient Container Lines (OOCL), a major global shipping company which his family controls. 
Aside from being one of the major Hong Kong corporations, it is also perceived to have strong 
connections with the Mainland Chinese government. For a discussion of the criticism of Tung’s 
policies and his skills of governance, see Ming K. Chan, “The SAR in Flux,” 2002. 
 
xix
 The environmental activists, led by The Society for the Protection of the Harbour, had just 
recently stopped a major reclamation proposal by the government. In this controversy, half of the 
proposed reclamation for the Central-Wanchai Bypass was stopped through a court challenge, 
while the other half was allowed to procede through a legal technicality. The issue of upgrading 
and protecting Victoria Harbour has been a major rallying point for activists in recent years.   
 
xx
 The developers also claimed that they would reuse 95% of the construction materials in 
construction works in Mainland China. In addition, new measures would be set to reduce noise 
and air pollution to safeguard the well-being of neighboring residents. SCMP, 17 January 2004, 
p.17. 
 
xxi
 Indeed, moral education for the young generation has always been a consistent focus in the 
campaigns of FOE, which regularly orchestrates school children to protest against environmental 
injustice with the aim to “touch the heart” of the public. 
 
xxii
 See Plehwe et al.’s discussion on the role of NGOs and “private authorities,” in “Reconsidering 
Neoliberal Hegemony,” p.16. 
 
xxiii
 Among these were the Hong Kong Institute of Architects and Hong Kong Institute of Planners, 
both of which strongly criticized the planning and design aspects of the cultural hub.  
 
xxiv
 Under the Environmental Impact Ordinance, only new construction projects which have been 
gazetted and are of sufficient scale are required to conduct an environmental impact assessment.  
 
xxv
 A land premium is paid based on the difference of value between clear land and land in its 
proposed use (or between its original use and proposed use if it is an upgrade to an existing 
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property). But this land premium is subject to individual negotiation with the government. This 
raises the question of what level of return has been assumed to be “normal” for property 
developers, since their profitability (in a general sense) can be set by the government. The effect of 
this (along with the government’s control of new land supply and provision of public housing) is 
that the market that developers encounter and the market activities they undertake are significantly 
determined by their relationship with, and influence on, the government.  
 
xxvi
 A Reit is a special purpose investment company set up to hold property assets on the behalf of 
the investing public. Long popular in the United Sates and other countries, the Link Reit was to be 
one of the largest in the world, and the first launched in Hong Kong. 
 
xxvii
 As mentioned earlier in the Hunghom case, the Housing Authority is the quasi government 
agency in charge of the renting and selling of public housing in Hong Kong and its associated 
supporting amenities and infrastructure.  
 
xxviii
 This included a total of one million square feet of retail space (151 shopping malls) and 
79,000 parking spaces.  
 
xxix 
 Hong Kong has historically gone through multiple periods of highly speculative activity in the 
stock and property markets. In the case of the Link Reit the public and institutional investors were 
so certain of immediate gains, that they had pledged to buy 120 times the shares that were actually 
on offer. Hence their ire when Ms. Lo put a spanner in the works.  
 
xxx
 The underwriters of the deal returned 1.67 billion U.S. dollars to 510,000 small investors and 
1.28 billion U.S. dollars to institutional investors. Deutshe-Presse-Agentur, 20 December, 2004.  
 
xxxi
 One of the two legislators was the outspoken media critic Albert Cheng, who had written a 
series of high-profile commentaries in major newspapers about the case. 
 
xxxiii
 The SAR government was severely criticized for undermining judicial independence in several 
cases in the years following the handover. These include most notably the reinterpretation of the 
right of abode for Hong Kong residents’ mainland children, and the Chief Executive’s open 
condemnation of the Falun Gong. See Ming K. Chan, “The SAR in Flux,” p.7.  
 
xxxiv
 One of the investors filed a claim seeking $3,848 (US$493), which covered potential profits 
from the 1,5000 Link units he bought and transport expenses related to the purchase. The other 
investor claimed compensation of $1,992 (US$255), which covered potential profits from 500 
Link units he bought and one working hour he lost when buying them.  
 
xxxv
 The delay of Lo’s appeal was due to a rejection by the government of her application for legal 
aid – a move that incited another round of criticism of the government in the media. After being 
given an extension for her appeal period, she was finally granted the aid with a second application. 
 
xxxvi
 This is most notably represented by the Chief Executive who spoke strongly against “collusion 
between business and government” while citing concerns regarding the erosion of Hong Kong’s 
free market. See SCMP 17 January, 2005. 
 
xxxvii
 The original suggestion by the former Hong Kong Tourist Association was to create a series 
of events venues on part of the newly completed West Kowloon reclamation. Details of the 
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original concept of the cultural hub were released in a separate report by the SAR government in 
1999. 
xxxviii
 Under the new plan, the area of the hub was increased from the original proposed 5.5 hectares 
to the entire 40 hectares of the reclaimed site. 
 
xxxix
 Also see “West Kowloon Cultural District Project to Bring Long-term Benefits to Hong 
Kong,” World News Connection, 5 September 2003. 
 
xlFor a discussion on the relationships between government and business, see Leo Goodstadt, 
Uneasy Partners: The Conflict Between Public Interest and Private Profit, 2005; Lui, “How a 
fragmented business-government alliance has helped change Hong Kong’s political order,” 2008; 
and Webb, “Why You Should March for Democracy.” 2004.  
 
xli
 Under the government’s “joint guarantee” arrangement, small developers were allowed to take 
part in the West Kowloon development in the form of a joint venture. But many developers were 
upset with this rule, which required every partner to be held equally liable regardless of the size of 
their investments.  
 
xlii
 Since all the works in the West Kowloon development were not classified as “public works” but 
“facilities to be used by the public,” and because they involved no government expenditure, they 
did not have to obtain the Legislative Council’s Finance Committee’s approval – a procedure 
normally required for all government capital projects in Hong Kong.  
 
xliii
 The Town Planning Board is a monitoring body made up of government officials and outside 
professionals. Appointed under the Town Planning Ordinance, the board’s primary role is to 
review and grant approvals for all planning projects in Hong Kong. 
 
xliv
 The five bidders include World City Culture Park (Henderson Land Development), Swire 
Properties, Dynamic Star International (a joint venture of Cheung Kong Holdings and Sun Hung 
Kai Properties), Sunny Development (a joint venture of Wharf Holdings, Sino land, Chinese 
Estates and Ka Wah) and individual bidder Lam Sze-tat. 
 
xlv
 In this motion, the consultation period for the project, which began in January 2005, was 
proposed to be extended from 3 to 6 months.  
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